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In the study of the evolution of cooperation, resource limitations are usually assumed just to provide a finite
population size. Recently, however, it has been pointed out that resource limitation may also generate dynamical
payoffs able to modify the original structure of the games. Here we study analytically a phase transition from a
homogeneous population of defectors when resources are abundant to the survival of unconditional cooperators
when resources reduce below a threshold. To this end, we introduce a model of simple agents, with no memory
or ability of recognition, interacting in well-mixed populations. The result might shed light on the role played by
resource constraints on the origin of multicellularity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is common in nature in all levels of biological
organization [1], and it is considered to have played a
key role in the evolutionary appearance of higher selective
units, such as eukaryotic cells or multicellular life, from
simpler components [2]. However, its widespread abundance
is intriguing because cooperators are vulnerable to exploitation
by defectors [3], as detected early on [4,5]. Since then, several
mechanisms have been found allowing cooperative behav-
iors to survive, such as network structure, group selection,
direct and indirect reciprocity, and tag-based donation [6,7].
Behavioral mechanisms—the latter three are examples of such
mechanisms—require players to have some ability to avoid the
exploitation from defectors, such as memory or the capacity
to recognize the coplayer [6,7]. As a result, simple agents
without these abilities, such as unconditional cooperators, are
not expected to survive in well-mixed populations.
Aside from a few examples [8–11], the role played by the
limitation of resources in most evolutionary game theoretical
studies on the origin and persistence of cooperation has
been just to impose a constant population size [6,7,12–17].
Recently, however, we have put forward a new viewpoint in
which the interacting players are set into a nonequilibrium
context [18–20]. The environment is considered explicitly
by introducing a resource flux into the system that drives it
away from equilibrium. This standpoint leads to unexpected
outcomes, such as the fact that resource limitation allows
for stable coexistence between unconditional cooperators
and defectors, and even dominance of cooperation, in well-
mixed populations playing an a priori Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) game. This happens due to a self-organizing process
involving the environment which generates dynamical payoffs
transforming the original PD structure into a neutral game.
One of the main results of the analysis performed in [19,20]
is that a well-mixed population of unconditional cooperators
extinguishes for infinite resources (where the system plays a
PD game) but may survive for some parameter values when
resources are finite (where the game is not a PD anymore).
This suggests the possibility of a transition from a population
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of only defectors when resources are abundant to a population
containing cooperators for more stringent environments. The
existence of this transition should be of great interest, since
it would provide a resource-based mechanism preventing the
spread of defectors and thus may shed light on the conditions
under which cooperators could survive during the evolutionary
process. Indeed, the survival of cooperative strains has been
recently observed experimentally in yeast (S. Cerevisiae)
[21–23] and bacterial (E. Coli) [24,25] cultures and has also
been found in a model for the survival of aerobic cells inside
anaerobic cultures [26,27]. The models depicted in [19,20],
however, do not yield such a transition: in these models we
considered that the population was ruled by a resource limiting
reproduction and that deaths occurred at a constant rate, so that
the limiting resource influx determined the population size; as
was thoroughly discussed, a reduction in the resource flux just
decreased the size of the population in the same proportion,
but it did not modify its composition. Our aim here is to devise
a scenario in which the selection pressure driven by resource
limitation combined with the nonlinearities induced by this
resource limitation in the interactions among players may lead
to a transition of the type discussed above.
II. MODEL
We assume a limiting resource that constrains reproduction
in a population of constant size due, for instance, to space
constraints. The plausibility of the latter assumption is dis-
cussed at the end of the paper. The model developed here is a
stylized one inspired in the model of [20], which consists of an
evolving population of self-replicating individuals that receive
resources from the environment and exchange resources during
interactions. In order to avoid the effect of spatial structure
and focus on the effect of resource constraints, we consider
a well-mixed population. No memory, learning abilities, or
any other sensory inputs are assumed. Each individual i is
represented by its amount of resources, Ei , which in this
simplified model is either zero or one, and its strategy, namely,
cooperation C or defection D. Its amount of resources may
be interpreted as the amount that either belongs to it or is
available to it (it may be in its surroundings, for instance).
Each defector attacks at a rate α per unit time to individuals
chosen at random and steals its internal resources. To do
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so, the defector must have internal resources greater than
zero (i.e., Ei = 1), otherwise it does not attack. In every
interaction, the defector loses its unit of resources with
probability q, which can thus be seen as the average cost
paid by a defector in an interaction. If the interaction partner
has no resources, no reward is obtained. Cooperators do
nothing; they just eventually suffer from defectors’ attacks.
We assume that behaviors are inherited without mutation and
represent physiologic or morphologic characteristics intrinsic
to individuals which cannot be modified by choice.
Each individual receives from the environment γ units of
resources per unit time independently of its strategy, thus not
modifying the interaction payoff structure. When an individual
with internal resources Ei = 1 receives an extra unit of
resources it splits into two identical copies, each one with
Ei = 1. Along with reproduction, we assume that players die
with a probability f , independently of its strategy, in such a
way that the number of individuals in the population remains
constant. Therefore, resource allocation, reproduction, and
death rules are equal for both cooperators and defectors,
strategy being the only difference.
Let us note that, in this model, an increase in the environ-
mental resource supply is represented by an increase in γ ,
the amount of per capita resources obtained by individuals.
This contrasts with the model in [19,20], where an increase
of resources leads to a proportional increase in the population
size while keeping the same per capita value.
We consider simultaneous interactions and large popula-
tions so that we can make a continuum approach. We denote
by c0 and c1 the fraction of cooperators with internal resources
zero and one, and we denote by d1 and d0 = 1 − c0 − c1 − d1
the fraction of defectors with internal resources one and
zero, respectively. The equations governing the evolution of
cooperators are the following:
dc0
dt
= αc1d1 − γ c0 − f c0, (1)
dc1
dt
= −αc1d1 + γ (c0 + c1) − f c1. (2)
The αc1d1 term shows the fraction of cooperators C1 that
lose their internal resource unit after the attack of defectors
(the latter pertaining to the population d1); these individuals
move from population c1 to c0. The term in γ c0 quantifies the
fraction of individuals C0 that change to population c1 after
getting a unit of resources from the environment. In addition,
individuals in population c1 that receive resources from the
environment replicate, thus increasing the c1 population. The
terms f ci describe the fraction of individuals dying in each
population per unit time.
To describe the evolution of defectors is enough to write
the equation for population d1 because d0 is just the remaining
fraction of the whole population. The dynamic equation for d1
is
dd1
dt
= −αqd1 + αc1d1 + γ (d0 + d1) − f d1. (3)
The terms related to deaths and resource allocation from
the environment are analogous to those for cooperators. The
interaction term is as follows. On the one hand, with probability
q individuals D1 lose their resource units when interacting
with individuals C0,D0, and D1; this leads to a decrease
in the population of d1 in an amount αqd1(c0 + d0 + d1).
On the other hand, when interacting with individuals C1,
individuals D1 sequester their resource units; therefore, either
the population of D1 does not change, with probability q, or it
increases due to reproduction at a rate αc1d1(1 − q).
To complete the equations of the model, we need an
expression for the death rate f . In order to have a constant
population size, the frequency of deaths must equal the
frequency of reproductions. This leads to
f = γ (c1 + d1) + α(1 − q)(c1 + d1)d1. (4)
The first term denotes reproduction due to resource al-
location, and the second one denotes reproduction of D1
individuals when attacking individuals with Ei = 1 and not
paying the cost. Equations (1)–(4) are the equations of our
model. They can be further simplified by noticing that one
can divide all the equations by parameter γ and absorb it
into the time parameter; therefore, there are just two dimen-
sionless parameters in the model, q and β = α/γ . A large
β value indicates either large defector attack rates or small
resource influxes from the environment; conversely, large
resource influxes or small attacking rates yield small β values.
The dimensionless equations are the same as Eqs. (1)–(4),
replacing α by β and γ by 1.
III. PHASE TRANSITION TO COEXISTENCE
OF COOPERATION AND DEFECTION
The numerical resolution of the model shows that the
system is attracted to a globally stable fixed point independent
of initial conditions. Depending on the parameter values, the
final fate is either a population of defectors (an expected
solution) or, interestingly, a stable mixture of cooperators and
defectors. Remarkably enough, for fixed q, small β values,
i.e., large resource influxes, provide a population of just
defectors, but when β exceeds a critical value βc a mixed
state appears, thus providing a smooth phase transition from
defective states to mixed states as resources become scarce
[see Fig. 1(a)]. The existence of stable mixed states in the
model may be explained in terms of the overexploitation
mechanism discussed in [19]: an excess of defectors may
reduce cooperators’ resource contents and, as a result, the
average reward obtained by defectors; eventually, rewards
decrease below costs and cooperators recover. Interestingly, we
can obtain simple analytical expressions for the composition
of the mixed state as a function of parameter β above the
threshold:
ci = ai
(
1 − βc
β
)
, d1 = a2
β
, (5)
with ai and βc being functions of parameter q.
Remarkably, the dynamics in coexistence states self-
organizes defectors’ rewards to be (almost) equal to costs,
thus turning the payoff matrix to neutral. According to the
model, the payoff matrix for an average interaction is
C D
C
D
( 0 −E′r
E′r − Ec −Ec
)
, (6)
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FIG. 1. (a) Phase transition for q = 0.5. The fractions of coop-
erators c0 and c1 and defectors d1 (see text) above the threshold are
denoted with solid, dashed, and dotted lines, respectively. Below the
critical value βc = 7.58, cooperators die out. (b) Defectors’ benefit
vs costs in coexistence states. It equals the frequency rate function
f (q) (see text). The dashed line E′r = q is a guide to the eye.
with E′r being the average reward obtained when a defector
attacks a cooperator, and Ec = q being the average cost paid
when a defector attacks. Then, the average reward received by
defectors when interacting with cooperators is E′r = c1/(c0 +
c1). Equation (5) shows that E′r = a1/(a0 + a1) and thus it
is a function dependent only on q, not on β. Figure 1(b)
displays the reward E′r as obtained numerically versus the cost
q, showing that E′r  q. They are not exactly equal because,
as explained in Eq. (4) of [19], they may differ when death
frequencies f are not small compared with resource intake.
In this model, f cannot be arbitrarily chosen because of
the constant population condition. Indeed, Eqs. (1) and (2)
readily show that f = c1/(c0 + c1) = E′r , so that Fig. 1(b)
also displays f (q). One observes that f is generally of order 1
[this is the cause of the small deviations found in Fig. 1(b)]. At
small q, however, f is also small and E′r and q match perfectly.
One can further study the transition by drawing a phase
diagram β − q with the regions in which each behavior
dominates. It is possible to obtain an analytical expression
for the critical curve βc(q) by performing a stability analysis.
To do so, let us recall that for a fixed point to be stable in
three dimensions the trace and determinant of the Jacobian
matrix must be negative. Our model system, Eqs. (1)–(4), has
at least two fixed points, corresponding to pure populations of
cooperators and defectors: (1) point A, c1 = 1 (the remaining
variables equal to zero), and (2) point B, c0 = c1 = 0 and
d1 = 0, obeying, according to Eq. (3),
d1(f + βq) = 1. (7)
As we know, it may also have a mixed fixed point, given
by Eq. (5), but it need not be considered for our present
purpose. Linear stability of fixed point A leads to the Jacobian
matrix:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
−2 0 β
1 −1 −1 − 2β + βq
−1 −1 β(1 − q) − 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠, (8)
with determinant D = 4β(1 − q) > 0. The positive sign
shows that at least one of its three eigenvalues is positive.
Then point A is always unstable for q < 1 and cooperators
never occupy the whole population. Fixed point B provides
the following Jacobian matrix:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−1 − f∗ βd∗1 0
1 1 − βd∗1 − f ∗ 0
−1 −1 − d∗1 dfdc1 + βd∗1 −βq − f∗ − d∗1
df
dd1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠,
(9)
where d∗1 and f∗ are the values of these quantities in fixed
point B. To be compact, let us call J33 = −{βq + f∗ + d∗1 [1 +
2β(1 − q)d∗1 ]} < 0. The trace is T = J33 − 2f∗ − βd∗1 < 0,
and the determinant can be written as
D = J33(−1 + βd∗1 f∗ + f 2∗ ). (10)
Then, for point B to be stable the term inside the parentheses
has to be positive. Although this is not a sufficient condition
to prove that point B is stable, the numerical resolution of
Eqs. (1)–(4) shows that this is the case; this is the region
in which defectors are dominant. When the term inside the
parentheses in Eq. (10) is negative point B becomes unstable,
which means that a small fraction of cooperators will grow
and survive (notice that point B is the only fixed point with
only defectors). Then, since point A is also unstable, in this
situation there must exist a third (mixed) fixed point in the
dynamics. Equation (5) supplies the solution for this mixed
fixed point, and numerical solutions show it is a stable attractor,
the one describing the stationary coexistence of cooperators
and defectors found at large β values. In order to obtain the
curve βc(q) separating the regions of dominance of defectors
from the mixture of cooperators and defectors, we should find
d∗1 from Eqs. (4) and (7) and solve the equation
−1 + βcd∗1 f∗ + f 2∗ = 0. (11)
The exact analytical solution of this transition curve is very
cumbersome, so we try two alternative routes. One is to obtain
a numerical solution (see Fig. 2); the other is to find an
approximate analytical solution. In this sense, let us note that,
if β2q3  1, Eqs. (4) and (7) show that d∗1  (βq)−1, because
βq  f∗  (βq2)−1. In this limit, the instability condition
Eq. (11) just gives
βc = q−3, (12)
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FIG. 2. Phase diagram. The solid line indicates the numerical
solution; the dashed line indicates the analytical approximation βc =
q−3. Cooperation is favored at large β, i.e., small resource fluxes or
large attacking rates (see text).
which provides an excellent approximation not only for
β2c q
3  q−3  1 (say q  0.5) but over the whole range
0  q  1, as shown when compared with the exact numerical
solution (Fig. 2).
Figure 2 shows that cooperation is favored at large costs q
and large β, whereas defectors dominate in the opposite limit.
The origin of the dependence on the average cost q is rather
direct: the larger the cost, the less favorable it is for defectors
to reproduce. The dependence on parameter β is, however,
counterintuitive since (at first sight) one would expect that large
attack rates (large β) should benefit defectors. The explanation
is not easy due to the nonlinearities involved in the model.
One might think that the origin of the observed behavior relies
on the exploitation mechanism, which explains the existence
itself of coexistence states, and accordingly reason that large
attacking rates would cause a great damage on cooperators,
which would reduce rewards over costs, ultimately harming
defectors. However, this is not what happens, since we have
seen above that the average reward E′r is a function of q only,
and it does not change when increasing β at fixed q.
One explanation of why large β favors cooperators is that
it leads to a small fraction of defectors in the active state
(D1), thus reducing the damage on cooperators. In effect, if
resources are abundant individuals receive them frequently
and there will be large populations of D1 individuals; if
resources are scarce, only a few individuals will be in
state Ei = 1. The same occurs if attacking rates are large.
Since attacks are indiscriminate, defectors are also victim of
the attacks, which decrease the number of D1 individuals; the
opposite is true for small attacking rates. This explanation
is consistent with the behavior of d1 displayed in Fig. 1(a).
Indeed, d1 decreases from β = 0, i.e., below the transition,
as can be seen from our approximate solution d∗1  (βq)−1.
Below some critical population value depending on q (around
q2), the reduced population of defectors in the active state is
not capable of extinguishing cooperators. It is worthwhile to
point out that parasites continuously receive resources from the
environment, interact, and change from active to inactive states
continuously. In the stationary state, the fraction of defectors in
the population is d0 + d1. These defectors spend a fraction of
time d0/(d0 + d1) in inactive states and d1/(d0 + d1) in active
states.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have developed a simple model describing
a phase transition from defective parasitic populations (which
dissipate some amount of resources in order to gain a higher
reproduction rate) when resources are abundant to the survival
of cooperators when resources are scarce. This is the result
of a self-organizing process involving subtle nonlinearities in
the interactions induced by resource constraints. In contrast to
previous models, in which the same limiting resource ruled re-
production and population size [19,20] and this transition was
not displayed, the model studied here assumes that the factor
limiting reproduction is different from the one limiting the
population size, so that population size remains approximately
constant. This may be accomplished in chemostat or retentostat
experiments [28–31], which may allow for laboratory testing
of the predictions of the model. Indeed, recent experiments
with S. Cerevisiae [21] and E. Coli [24] at low concentration
of glucose agree with the results presented here of the survival
of cooperative traits instead of their expected extinction in
unstructured populations.
In natural environments, the constant population assump-
tion may apply in situations in which space constrains the size
of the population more restrictively than resource scarcity.
Of course, a complete description of spatially distributed
populations goes beyond the mean-field model presented
here and should consider that interactions occur only among
neighbors. Note, however, that space alone is well known
to favor cooperation because it permits the formation of
clusters of cooperators. Since we have seen here that resource
limitation alone already allows for the survival of cooperation,
the combined effects of both space and resource limitations are
expected to enhance the conditions under which cooperators
can prevent their extinction. Other extensions of the model,
besides the inclusion of space, may be the introduction of
continuous behaviors (and not just cooperation and defection),
which could shed light on the observed phenotypic radiation
of behaviors in E. Coli [25], which represents an exception to
the competitive exclusion principle [32].
In a broader scope, the results presented here might have
played a role in the route toward the emergence of multi-
cellularity by cooperative aggregation triggered by resource
constraints. It has been argued [22,26,27] that such transition
happened whenever cooperative individuals formed clusters,
which subsequently evolved nutrient exchange between the
components of the cluster and later evolved a joint replication
mechanism, a stage at which a higher-order organism can be
considered to exist. However, such studies do not explain why
cooperative bacteria survived in a first stage before forming
clusters. The mechanism presented here provides some in-
sights for the maintenance of such cooperative individuals
before clusters of cooperators could form, being a first step
toward the formation of multicellular organisms.
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